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NATO – EU Maritime Cooperation

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1 Introduction

Seas cover 70 % of the surface of the Earth. Furthermore, 90 % of the world's trade and about half of the world's oil are transported by sea putting strain on international chokepoints such as the Strait of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal or the Gulf of Aden.^{1 2}

The geopolitical significance of the maritime domain has been recognised by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at its Wales Summit in 2014, which has also highlighted the importance of close cooperation, co-ordination and complementarity with the European Union.³

The current threats in the maritime domain include terrorism, piracy, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and recently mainly illegal trafficking of humans and narcotics. All these issues are of transnational character, and cannot be dealt with unilaterally or purely with military means.⁴ Therefore, not only do they present a challenge to the security of the Alliance, but also a possibility for deepening of the relations with the EU – another player in the global security arena.

2 NATO-EU Relations

“So we have actually concluded more formal arrangements in the past six months than in the previous thirteen years. And that says something about the progress we are making in the cooperation between NATO and the EU.”

Jens Stoltenberg, 8 July 2016

2.1 History of the European defence policy

Ideas of economic, social and defence cooperation dominated the post-War Europe. Prior to the establishment of NATO in 1949,⁵ the Brussels Treaty (signed by the UK, France and the Benelux countries) laid the foundations of the Western European Union (WEU), a distinct organisation from what later became the European Union.⁶

In 1950, a plan for the creation of the European Defence Community, which included establishing a European army, was proposed. Nevertheless, this plan was rejected four years later.⁷ As a result, the Brussels Treaty was modified, and a defensive alliance (the already mentioned WEU) was created to provide mutual military assistance in resisting external aggression.⁸

Since then, European defence policy had developed simultaneously within the EU, the WEU and NATO.⁹ Nonetheless, whilst NATO was expanding its action radius and becoming the major transatlantic defence institution, the EU and the WEU

¹ Jopling, Lord, *Maritime Security: NATO and EU roles and Co-ordination*. Available from: <http://bit.ly/2b3aQRI>

² Chapsos, Ioannis and Kitchen, Cassie, *Strengthening Maritime Security Through Cooperation*. 2015.

³ NATO, *Wales Summit Declaration*. Available from: <http://bit.ly/1AeY2eg>

⁴ Jopling, Lord, *Maritime Security: NATO and EU roles and Co-ordination*. Available from: <http://bit.ly/2b3aQRI>

⁵ NATO, *What is NATO?*. Available from: <http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/>

⁶ NATO, *Relations with the EU*. Available from:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm

⁷ CVCE, *The failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) - From the Messina Conference to the Rome Treaties (EEC and EAEC)*. Available from: <http://bit.ly/2aCrScL>

⁸ European External Action Service, *About CSDP - The Western European Union*. Available from: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/weu/index_en.htm

⁹ EUR-Lex, *The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy*. Available from: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:ai0026>



had hardly any influence over this field.¹⁰ The WEU functioned as a forum for consultation, though the implementation of its solidarity and military assistance clause was left to NATO.¹¹

2.2 The beginnings of formal cooperation

The EU adopted the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, envisaging a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)¹² and marking the beginning of the slow incorporation of the WEU into the EU – a deed finished with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, which contains the mutual defence clause.¹³

Through the establishment of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance in 1996, the European and the North American roles and responsibilities within the Alliance were supposed to be rebalanced¹⁴ so as to lift the burden the United States had on Europe's defence.^{15 16}

As with the EU, their incapability during the Balkan Wars demonstrated the need to give the Union more instruments for action. A Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo in 1998 allowed for the founding of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in order to make the EU operational.¹⁷

First formal NATO-EU meeting at the level of foreign ministers was held in 2001.¹⁸ Thereafter, the 2002 NATO-EU Declaration on a European Security and Defence Policy reiterated effective mutual consultation and reaffirmed the EU could have access to NATO's planning capabilities.¹⁹

2.3 The “Berlin Plus” agreements and the participation problem

In 2003, NATO and the EU accepted a landmark series of arrangements known as the “Berlin Plus” agreements. Through this milestone in NATO-EU cooperation, the EU was granted access to NATO's resources and structures, in particular NATO's strategic command for operations, SHAPE. NATO would support EU-lead operations even if it as a whole was not engaged. In such case, the commander of the mission would be the NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), who is always a European.^{20 21 22 23}

From 2001 to 2003, the North Atlantic Council met regularly with the Political and Security Committee (PSC), a Committee of the Council of the European

¹⁰ Schleich, Caja, NATO and EU in conflict regulation. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*.

¹¹ European External Action Service, *About CSDP - The Western European Union*. Available from: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/weu/index_en.htm

¹² NATO, *Relations with the EU*. Available from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm

¹³ European External Action Service, *About CSDP - The Western European Union*. Available from: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/weu/index_en.htm

¹⁴ NATO, *Relations with the EU*. Available from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm

¹⁵ Thies, Wallace J., *Friendly rivals: Bargaining and Burden-shifting in NATO*. 2003.

¹⁶ Carpenter, Ted G., 2000, *NATO enters the 21st century*. 2000.

¹⁷ Schleich, Caja, NATO and EU in conflict regulation. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*.

¹⁸ NATO, *Relations with the EU*. Available from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm

¹⁹ NATO, *Fact sheet NATO - EU Relations*. Available from: http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160630_1607-factsheet-nato-en-en.pdf

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ Schleich, Caja, NATO and EU in conflict regulation. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*.

²² Gebhard, Carmen and Smith, Simon John, *The two faces of EU-NATO cooperation. Cooperation and Conflict*.


²³ NATO Multimedia Library, *NATO - EU Relations*. Available from: <http://www.natolibguides.info/nato-eu>



Union, which deals with the CSFP and at the moment comprises of 28 ambassadors.²⁴ During these meetings, a broad variety of issues was discussed.²⁵ Nonetheless, the 2004 enlargement of the EU has severely changed the situation²⁶ because of what the European Council stated in Copenhagen in 2002:²⁷

“[T]he “Berlin Plus” arrangements and the implementation thereof will apply only to those EU Member States which are also either NATO members or parties to the “Partnership for Peace”, and which have consequently concluded bilateral security arrangements with NATO.”

Figure 1: NATO, EU, and Partnership for Peace countries^{28 29 30} (purple for both NATO and EU, orange for NATO only, blue for both EU and PfP, red for PfP only, green for EU only)



Hence, Cyprus, which is the only EU country that is neither NATO nor PfP member, cannot participate in official NATO-EU meetings, for it does not have an arrangement with NATO on exchange of classified documents.³¹

²⁴ EUR-lex, *Political and Security Committee (PSC)*. Available from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/political_security_committee.html

²⁵ Smith, Simon John, EU–NATO cooperation: a case of institutional fatigue? *European Security*.

²⁶ Ibidem.

²⁷ Haine, Jean-Yves, *From Laeken to Copenhagen: European defence: core documents*. Available from: <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/chai57e.pdf>

²⁸ NATO, *NATO Member Countries*. Available from:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/nato_countries.htm

²⁹ European Union, *Member countries of the EU (year of entry)*. Available from:

https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en

³⁰ NATO, *Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document* Available from:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_82584.htm

³¹ NATO, *Relations with the EU*. Available from:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm



This is a consequence of the Turkey-Cyprus conflict, which stems from an Athens-inspired coup in 1974 seeking union with Greece.³² As a result, Turkey occupied the northern third of the island. In 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared. However, the only country to recognise it is Turkey.³³

Correspondingly, Turkey blocks Cyprus from joining the PfP, whilst Cyprus assures that only Berlin Plus matters can be discussed at the NAC-PSC meetings.³⁴ Whenever Berlin Plus is not used, boundaries are imposed regarding passing of sensitive information.³⁵

2.4 Cooperation in the field

The Berlin Plus arrangements provided a framework for practical cooperation of the institutions on the ground. However, the possibilities thus put forward have not been frequently exploited.³⁶ The following chapters elaborate on both the operations that took advantage of Berlin Plus and those which did not.

2.4.1. OPERATIONS CONCORDIA AND ALTHEA

Operations Concordia and Althea are the only two EU-led missions utilizing the Berlin Plus agreements.³⁷ Though in fact, in both cases, the EU assumed command of operations previously conducted by NATO.³⁸

Operation Concordia was the first EU-led military mission, which took over NATO's Operation Allied Harmony. Its tasks were the same – responsibility for the safety of the observers monitoring the restoration of the authority of the Macedonian government. The operation commenced in 2003 and was terminated in the same year.³⁹

Following the decision by NATO to conclude the SFOR-operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU launched Operation Althea in 2004 to contribute to a safe environment and to provide capacity building and training to the local Armed Forces.⁴⁰

Operation Althea is the only formal topic at the NAC-PSC meetings. With the long duration and low military intensity of the mission, the formal meetings have become infrequent,⁴¹ and the two bodies only meet for informal discussions.⁴²

2.4.2. KOSOVO

NATO has been leading a peace support operation in Kosovo (KFOR) since 1999 to the present day in order to maintain security.⁴³ At the same time, the EU has operated

³² The Guardian, *Cyprus peace deal could come this year, confirm Turkey and US*. Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/29/cyprus-peace-deal-could-come-this-year-confirm-turkey-and-us>

³³ BBC News, *Cyprus country profile*. Available from: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17217956>

³⁴ Smith, Simon John, EU-NATO cooperation: a case of institutional fatigue? *European Security*.

³⁵ Gebhard, Carmen and Smith, Simon John, The two faces of EU-NATO cooperation. *Cooperation and Conflict*.

³⁶ Smith, Simon John, EU-NATO cooperation: a case of institutional fatigue? *European Security*.

³⁷ NATO, *Fact sheet NATO - EU Relations*. Available from:

http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160630_1607-factsheet-nato-eu-en.pdf

³⁸ Smith, Simon John, EU-NATO cooperation: a case of institutional fatigue? *European Security*.

³⁹ Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands, *Operation Concordia*. Available from:

<https://www.defensie.nl/english/topics/historical-missions/documents/leaflets/2011/02/21/operation-concordia>

⁴⁰ European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOR, *European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina - ABOUT EUFOR*. Available from: <http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php/about-eufor>

⁴¹ Smith, Simon John, EU-NATO cooperation: a case of institutional fatigue? *European Security*.

⁴² NATO, *Relations with the EU*. Available from:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm

⁴³ NATO Kosovo Force, *Mission*. Available from: <http://jfcnaples.nato.int/kfor/about-us/welcome-to-kfor/mission>



a mission titled EULEX Kosovo to assist the authorities in their progress towards rule of law.⁴⁴ Though the environment is not as dangerous as it used to be, the EU's civil mission still depends on NATO's protection.⁴⁵

There is no formal arrangement of NATO-EU cooperation regarding the deployments in Kosovo. Proposals beyond Berlin Plus have been blocked, yet four technical agreements have been signed, and cooperation on the ground is discreet, informal, and ad hoc.⁴⁶

2.4.3. AFGHANISTAN

Technical agreements for cooperation in Afghanistan were not even drafted. Thus, Afghanistan presents an alarmingly bad example of NATO-EU complementarity.⁴⁷

Terminated in 2014, NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan aimed at reducing the capability of the insurgency and supporting the Afghan National Security Forces and socio-economic developments.⁴⁸ Parallel to ISAF, the EU conducted a mission named EUPOL Afghanistan focusing on building a civilian police service.⁴⁹

The EU had to negotiate 14 separate arrangements on the protection of its personnel with the lead nations of individual Provincial Reconstruction Teams⁵⁰ so as to be able to deploy outside of Kabul.⁵¹ The EUPOL staff was dependent on NATO for travel despite not being included in NATO's Blue Force tracking system, which allowed NATO to track the position of all its deployed personnel at any given time.⁵²

2.5 On the road to Warsaw

The year 2016 has marked a renaissance in the efforts to deepen the ties between both organisations, especially in the areas of cyber security, countering hybrid threats, and maritime security.⁵³

After years of informal meetings and also talks on Ukraine, a Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence between NATO and the EU provided a framework for exchanging information and sharing best practices between the teams.⁵⁴

February 2016 has also seen the agreement to deploy NATO ships to the Aegean Sea,⁵⁵ which chapter 5.1 elaborates on.

During the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, a first of its kind document, the Joint Declaration, was signed by the President of the European Council Donald Tusk, the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, and NATO

⁴⁴ European Union Rule of Law Mission Kosovo, *What is EULEX?* Available from: <http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,16>

⁴⁵ Smith, Simon John, EU–NATO cooperation: a case of institutional fatigue? *European Security*.

⁴⁶ Ibidem.

⁴⁷ Ibidem.

⁴⁸ Resolute Support, *International Security Assistance Force*. Available from: http://www.rs.nato.int/templates/isaf2011_mobile/main.php#mission

⁴⁹ European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan, *EUPOL Afghanistan*. Available from: <http://www.eupol-afg.eu/node/2>

⁵⁰ Provincial Reconstruction Teams were small military and civilian units in Afghanistan's provinces that provided security for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction in areas of ongoing conflict. The PRTs were part of the ISAF Mission and thus commanded by NATO. NATO, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan – how they arrived and where they are going*. Available from: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue3/english/art2.html>

⁵¹ Lagadec, Erwan, *Transatlantic relations in the 21st century*. 2012.

⁵² Smith, Simon John, EU–NATO cooperation: a case of institutional fatigue? *European Security*.

⁵³ NATO, *Secretary General: A Strong European Union is important for NATO*. Available from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_132843.htm

⁵⁴ NATO, *Relations with the EU*. Available from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm

⁵⁵ BBC News, *Migrant crisis: Nato deploys Aegean people-smuggling patrols*. Available from: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35549478>



Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg.⁵⁶ The declaration outlines a series of actions most notably in the three aforementioned domains.⁵⁷

In the area of hybrid threats, resilience should be enhanced whereas playbooks (manuals for who does what) for coordinated procedures shall be developed. Although the ability to counter the threats ought to be boosted with parallel and coordinated exercises in 2017 and 2018, intelligence sharing between staffs will progress to the extent possible.⁵⁸

3 Alliance Maritime Strategy

In 1984, at the time of the Cold War, NATO published its very first Maritime Strategy, which focused on readiness to respond to a peer-to-peer conflict.⁵⁹ However, since then, the global security environment has evolved with new threats becoming more notable, e.g. international terrorism, threats to the energy infrastructure, proliferation of the WMDs, illegal movement of drugs, people and arms, or piracy.⁶⁰ Therefore, a new and much broader Alliance Maritime Strategy was produced in 2011.⁶¹

3.1 Roles

In accordance with the Strategic Concept, the Alliance Maritime Strategy established four roles to which NATO ought to be ready to contribute:

- deterrence and collective defence,
- crisis management,
- cooperative security: outreach through partnerships, dialogue and cooperation, and
- maritime security.⁶²

The Alliance Maritime Strategy allows NATO to conduct peace enforcement, embargo missions, counter-terrorism operations, mine clearance, port visits,⁶³ surveillance, and protection of freedom of navigation.⁶⁴

3.2 Alliance capabilities

NATO has a continuous naval presence provided by four groups of Standing Naval Forces, which carry out a programme of scheduled exercises, manoeuvres, and port

⁵⁶ Council of the European Union, *EU-US, EU-NATO and NATO Summit, Warsaw, Poland, 8-9 July 2016*.

Available from: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2016/08/160706-final-draft-warsaw-background_pdf/

⁵⁷ NATO, *Warsaw Summit Communiqué*. Available from: <http://bit.ly/29wBtNW>

⁵⁸ NATO, *Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*. Available from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133163.htm

⁵⁹ Chapsos, Ioannis and Kitchen, Cassie, *Strengthening Maritime Security Through Cooperation*.

⁶⁰ Jopling, Lord, *Maritime Security: NATO and EU roles and Co-ordination*. Available from: <http://bit.ly/2b3aQRI>

⁶¹ Chapsos, Ioannis and Kitchen, Cassie, *Strengthening Maritime Security Through Cooperation*.

⁶² NATO, *Alliance Maritime Strategy*. Available from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm

⁶³ Port visits allow for replenishment of stock and rest for sailors. They also provide an opportunity to enhance the relationship between the host country and the visitors, i.e. the representatives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Adams, Jason W., *An analysis of port-visit costs of U.S. Navy aircraft carriers*. Available from:

http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/4102/08Jun_Adams.pdf?sequence=1

⁶⁴ NATO, *Alliance Maritime Strategy*. Available from:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm



visits.⁶⁵ They can also be rapidly deployed in case of a crisis in support of NATO's rapid reaction spearhead force, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force.^{66 67}

The Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMG₁ and SNMG₂) are multinational forces with contributions from various Allies usually consisting of groups from two to six ships.⁶⁸ SNMG₁ is generally deployed in the Eastern Atlantic whereas SNMG₂ operates in the Mediterranean.⁶⁹ Both SNMG₁ and SNMG₂ report to the Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), based in Northwood, UK.⁷⁰

The Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups (SNMCMG₁ and SNMCMG₂) specialise in mine-clearing activities, though they also perform many of the same tasks as the SNMGs.⁷¹

4 Anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa

From the globally reported cases of piracy between 2007 and 2012, more than 40 % took place in the waters off the Somali coast.⁷² With the Gulf of Aden as a strategic chokepoint and a request from the UN Secretary General,⁷³ international efforts were launched to deter the acts of piracy at sea.⁷⁴

Both NATO and the EU have joined these efforts. Using SNMG₂, NATO launched Operation Allied Provider in October 2008 pending the establishment of an EU operation. Successively, EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta was introduced in December 2008, although without a formal takeover.⁷⁵ The apparent task-sharing and complementarity came to an end in March 2009. At that time, NATO announced Operation Allied Protector before starting Operation Ocean Shield with an enhanced mandate.⁷⁶

⁶⁵ NATO, *NATO's maritime activities*. Available from:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_70759.htm

⁶⁶ NATO Maritime Command, *SNMG₁ Changes Flag Ship*. Available from:

<http://www.mc.nato.int/PressReleases/Pages/SNMG1-Changes-Flag-Ship.aspx>

⁶⁷ NATO Maritime Command, *Operational Handover in the Aegean Sea*. Available from:

<http://www.mc.nato.int/PressReleases/Pages/Operational-Handover-in-the-Aegean-Sea.aspx>

⁶⁸ NATO, *NATO's maritime activities*. Available from:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_70759.htm

⁶⁹ Jopling, Lord, *Maritime Security: NATO and EU roles and Co-ordination*. Available from:

<http://bit.ly/2b3aQRI>

⁷⁰ NATO, *NATO's maritime activities*. Available from:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_70759.htm

⁷¹ Jopling, Lord, *Maritime Security: NATO and EU roles and Co-ordination*. Available from:

<http://bit.ly/2b3aQRI>

⁷² Gebhard, Carmen and Smith, Simon John, The two faces of EU-NATO cooperation. *Cooperation and Conflict*.

⁷³ Jopling, Lord, *Maritime Security: NATO and EU roles and Co-ordination*. Available from:

<http://bit.ly/2b3aQRI>

⁷⁴ Gebhard, Carmen and Smith, Simon John, The two faces of EU-NATO cooperation. *Cooperation and Conflict*.

⁷⁵ Ibidem.

⁷⁶ Jopling, Lord, *Maritime Security: NATO and EU roles and Co-ordination*. Available from:

<http://bit.ly/2b3aQRI>



Figure 2: Area of Operation⁷⁷



The focus of both Atalanta and Ocean Shield is prevention of piracy, yet Atalanta takes a broader approach⁷⁸ including financial and political instruments.⁷⁹ Because it is more complex and better resourced, most states have chosen to operate under its command.⁸⁰

For the last successful attack took place in 2012, the Warsaw Summit confirmed terminating Ocean Shield at the end of 2016⁸¹ – the mandate of Atalanta will end at the same time.⁸²

The success of the missions is attributed to various factors – from the trust among the allies,⁸³ the fact that many of the nations participated in both the operations,⁸⁴ to the design of the missions. The international character allowed for ship-to-ship cooperation⁸⁵ as well as more hidden and, thus, effective processes.⁸⁶ Very significant was also the geographical proximity of the operational headquarters

⁷⁷ NATO Maritime Command, *Operation Ocean Shield*. Available from:

<http://www.mc.nato.int/about/Pages/Operation%20Ocean%20Shield.aspx>

⁷⁸ Jopling, Lord, *Maritime Security: NATO and EU roles and Co-ordination*. Available from:

<http://bit.ly/2b3aQRI>

⁷⁹ Gebhard, Carmen and Smith, Simon John, The two faces of EU-NATO cooperation. *Cooperation and Conflict*.

⁸⁰ Smith, Simon John, EU-NATO cooperation: a case of institutional fatigue? *European Security*.

⁸¹ NATO, 2016, *The Warsaw declaration on Transatlantic Security*. Available from:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133168.htm

⁸² EUNAVFOR Somalia, *Missions | EUNAVFOR Somalia*. Available from: <http://eunavfor.eu/mission/>

⁸³ Gebhard, Carmen and Smith, Simon John, The two faces of EU-NATO cooperation. *Cooperation and Conflict*.

⁸⁴ Jopling, Lord, *Maritime Security: NATO and EU roles and Co-ordination*. Available from:

<http://bit.ly/2b3aQRI>

⁸⁵ Gebhard, Carmen and Smith, Simon John, The two faces of EU-NATO cooperation. *Cooperation and Conflict*.

⁸⁶ Smith, Simon John, EU-NATO cooperation: a case of institutional fatigue? *European Security*.




of the missions – both residing in Northwood, UK,⁸⁷ which facilitated informal cooperation.⁸⁸

Nevertheless, no formal framework for cooperation has been agreed. The two chains of command have a very different structure; therefore, information sharing is very limited. The organisations have concluded arrangements so as to be able to pass, for example, photographs, but not analyses thereof.⁸⁹

To some extent, this has been overcome thanks to a discrete collaboration at the operational level as well as the establishment of the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) Group. It meets at a tactical level in Bahrain every eight weeks and involves all fleets operating in the region. This allows EU and NATO to coordinate their actions and exchange best practices with one another as well as with independent deployers (e.g. China) and US-led Combined Maritime Forces (a coalition focusing primarily on counter-terrorism operations).⁹⁰

5 Operations in the Mediterranean

Figure 3: Naval operations to combat irregular migration on the EU's borders⁹¹



⁸⁷ Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom, *Northwood Headquarters*. Available from:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/northwood-headquarters/northwood-headquarters>

⁸⁸ Gebhard, Carmen and Smith, Simon John, The two faces of EU-NATO cooperation. *Cooperation and Conflict*.

⁸⁹ Ibidem.

⁹⁰ Ibidem.

⁹¹ House of Lords, *Operation Sophia, the EU's naval mission in the Mediterranean*. Available from:

<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/144/14407.htm>



5.1 Deployments in the Aegean Sea

Upon a request of Germany, Greece, and Turkey, NATO defence ministers agreed on 11 February 2016 to assist with the growing migrant crisis in Europe, thus cooperating with the EU and its border management agency, Frontex.⁹²

NATO has deployed SNMG2 to conduct monitoring, reconnaissance, and surveillance of illegal crossings in the international as well as the territorial waters of Greece and Turkey,⁹³ but the purpose of the mission is not to stop or even sink the migrant ships.⁹⁴ Greek and Turkish authorities only operate in their own territorial waters, but NATO is sharing real-time information with them as well as with Frontex. NATO's capabilities complement those of Frontex, for its vessels are larger and their radars have a broader reach.⁹⁵

According to Jens Stoltenberg, this is an excellent example of NATO-EU cooperation to address common challenges with a very short time taken to take the decisions and make the arrangements.⁹⁶ On the contrary, the content of the mission has been criticized, for it does not affect the roots of the problem and merely deals with its consequences. Moreover, the question of deploying EU forces in the Aegean was barely raised.⁹⁷

5.2 Operation Active Endeavour

Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) was one of the eight initiatives launched as a support to the United States immediately after the 9/11 attacks.⁹⁸⁻⁹⁹ Its mandate was to deter and disrupt terrorist-related activity by patrolling the Mediterranean, tracking and controlling suspect vessels.¹⁰⁰⁻¹⁰¹ The remit of the OAE was extended to the entire Mediterranean in 2004.¹⁰²

As an Article 5 operation, it first involved member countries only. Some countries directly contributed their assets (mainly Greece, Italy, Spain, and Turkey), and the operation heavily relied on the logistic support of the Mediterranean allies.¹⁰³ OAE has also proved as a useful tool for improving practical cooperation with NATO's partners within the Mediterranean Dialogue (e.g. Israel and Morocco).¹⁰⁴ Among the participating countries were also Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia.¹⁰⁵

⁹² NATO, *Relations with the EU*. Available from:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm

⁹³ NATO Maritime Command, *Operational Handover in the Aegean Sea*. Available from:

<http://www.mc.nato.int/PressReleases/Pages/Operational-Handover-in-the-Aegean-Sea.aspx>

⁹⁴ NATO, *NATO Secretary General welcomes expansion of NATO deployment in the Aegean Sea*. Available from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_128833.htm

⁹⁵ NATO, *Assistance for the refugee and migrant crisis in the Aegean Sea*. Available from:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_128746.htm#

⁹⁶ NATO, *NATO Secretary General welcomes expansion of NATO deployment in the Aegean Sea*.

Available from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_128833.htm

⁹⁷ Chrysogelos, Angelos, *Nato's new migrant mission in the Aegean is a victory for Turkey and proof of Europe's strategic irrelevance*. Available from: <http://bit.ly/2au2WhT>

⁹⁸ NATO, *Operation Active Endeavour*. Available from:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm

⁹⁹ Chapsos, Ioannis and Kitchen, Cassie, *Strengthening Maritime Security Through Cooperation*.

¹⁰⁰ NATO, *NATO's maritime activities*. Available from:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_70759.htm

¹⁰¹ NATO Maritime Command, *Operation Active Endeavour*. Available from:

<http://www.mc.nato.int/ops/Pages/OAE.aspx>

¹⁰² NATO, *Operation Active Endeavour*. Available from:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm

¹⁰³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰⁴ Chapsos, Ioannis and Kitchen, Cassie, *Strengthening Maritime Security Through Cooperation*.

¹⁰⁵ NATO, *Operation Active Endeavour*. Available from:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm



NATO forces hailed¹⁰⁶ over 128,000 vessels and boarded around 172 suspect ships.¹⁰⁷ OAE also benefitted trade and economic activity in the Mediterranean by having an effect on the safety of NATO's southern flank.^{108 109} Most importantly, NATO acquired invaluable expertise in deterring terrorist maritime activity, preventing proliferation of WMDs, fostering information sharing, and cooperating with non-NATO countries.^{110 111}

5.3 Operation Sea Guardian

At the Warsaw Summit, the Allies have agreed to transition OAE from an Article 5 operation to a non-Article 5 Maritime Security Operation (i.e. mission dealing with issues such as piracy, terrorism or human trafficking),¹¹² Operation Sea Guardian.¹¹³

Having a broader scope than OAE,¹¹⁴ including situational awareness (i.e. gathering information on what is happening), capacity building, and other tasks as needed,¹¹⁵ Sea Guardian will work closely with EU's Operation Sophia (see chapter 5.4) in the Central Mediterranean. It will also build on the cooperation with the EU to discourage illegal human trafficking in the Aegean Sea.¹¹⁶

The Joint Declaration stresses the crucial need to broaden the operational collaboration at sea and on migration through mutual reinforcement of the activities in the Mediterranean.¹¹⁷ In Warsaw, the Alliance has also stated that:¹¹⁸

“We have agreed, in principle, on a possible NATO role in the Central Mediterranean, to complement and/or, upon European Union request, support, as appropriate, the EU’s Operation Sophia through the provision of a range of capabilities including Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, and logistics support; through contribution to capacity building of the Libyan coastguard and navy, if requested by the legitimate Libyan authorities and/or the EU; and in the context of the implementation of UNSCR 2292 on the situation in Libya, in close coordination with the EU.”

5.4 Operation Sophia

The EU anti-migrant smuggling operation in the Mediterranean (also known as EUNAVFOR Med or Operation Sophia) is one of the elements of EU response to the

¹⁰⁶ hail (v.) = to call another ship at sea, either by radio or shouting, to get her attention; SeaTalk Nautical Dictionary, *Hail: The Dictionary of English Nautical Language Database*. Available from: http://www.seatalk.info/cgi-bin/nautical-marine-sailing-dictionary/db.cgi?db=db&uid=default&FirstLetter=h&sb=Term&view_records=View

¹⁰⁷ NATO, *Operation Active Endeavour*. Available from:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm

¹⁰⁸ Chapsos, Ioannis and Kitchen, Cassie, *Strengthening Maritime Security Through Cooperation*.

¹⁰⁹ NATO, *Operation Active Endeavour*. Available from:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm

¹¹⁰ Chapsos, Ioannis and Kitchen, Cassie, *Strengthening Maritime Security Through Cooperation*.

¹¹¹ NATO, *Operation Active Endeavour*. Available from:

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¹¹² NATO Multimedia Library, Maritime Security. Available from: <http://bit.ly/2b2oabd>

¹¹³ NATO, *Warsaw Summit Communiqué*. Available from: <http://bit.ly/29wBtNW>

¹¹⁴ NATO, *Operation Active Endeavour*. Available from:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm

¹¹⁵ NATO, *Warsaw Summit Communiqué*. Available from: <http://bit.ly/29wBtNW>

¹¹⁶ NATO, *Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Heads of State and Government on Projecting Stability*. Available from:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_133797.htm?selectedLocale=en

¹¹⁷ NATO, *Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*. Available from:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133163.htm

¹¹⁸ NATO, *Warsaw Summit Communiqué*. Available from: <http://bit.ly/29wBtNW>



migration crisis.¹¹⁹ Unlike the NATO deployments in the Aegean Sea, its core task is to identify, capture, and dispose of vessels used or suspected of being used by smugglers and traffickers. The operation also aims at preventing further loss of life at sea, and as of September 2015, it had already contributed to saving around 1,500 lives at sea.¹²⁰

Launched in June 2015 and approved until July 2017, EUNAVFOR Med operates in the Southern Central Mediterranean with headquarters in Rome, Italy.¹²¹

The operation has four phases in total. The first phase, gathering information, was completed in September 2015. The second phase constitutes of boarding, search, seizure, and diversion of smugglers' vessels on the high seas. This activity may be extended to the territorial waters of the coastal states upon any applicable United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) and the consent of the respective states.¹²² Also dependent on UNSCR and consent of the states, the third phase encompasses all necessary measures against a vessel, including their disposal or rendering them inoperable in the territory of the states.¹²³ The fourth phase composes of forces withdrawal.¹²⁴

On 20 June 2016, two additional tasks were included – training of the Libyan coastguards and navy, and implementing the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya.¹²⁵

Fundamental Questions

With the pressing need to address the migrant crisis and the willingness of the representatives of both NATO and the EU, now more than ever is the time to find ways how these two institutions can cooperate in the maritime domain. Nonetheless, everything vastly depends on the member states themselves. Hence, the negotiations as well as the position papers shall focus on these questions:

- In general, what is the position of the state you represent towards the EU and its defence policy?
- How does your state contribute to NATO's maritime capabilities? What potential to contribute does it have? Where are its assets engaged?
- Is your state contributing to operations Sophia or Sea Guardian?
- What lessons can be learnt from the Horn of Africa as well as from other operations?
- How can the Alliance be inspired by the progress made in cooperating on cyber security and deterring hybrid threats?
- To what extent would your state favour complementing and/or supporting EU's Operation Sophia? Which forms of assistance should NATO provide?
- Should NATO expand its deployment in the Aegean Sea or in other parts of the Mediterranean to stem the illegal flow of migrants?

¹¹⁹ European External Action Service, *European Union Naval Force – Mediterranean*. Available from: https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavfor-med/pdf/factsheet_eunavfor_med_en.pdf

¹²⁰ Tardy, Thierry, *Operation Sophia: Tackling the refugee crisis with military means*. Available from: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_30_Operation_Sophia.pdf

¹²¹ European External Action Service, *European Union Naval Force – Mediterranean*. Available from: https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavfor-med/pdf/factsheet_eunavfor_med_en.pdf

¹²² Ibidem.

¹²³ Tardy, Thierry, *Operation Sophia: Tackling the refugee crisis with military means*. Available from: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_30_Operation_Sophia.pdf

¹²⁴ European External Action Service, *European Union Naval Force – Mediterranean*. Available from: https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavfor-med/pdf/factsheet_eunavfor_med_en.pdf

¹²⁵ Ibidem.



Recommended materials

NATO LibGuide on Maritime Security:

<http://www.natolibguides.info/maritimesecurity>

NATO LibGuide on NATO-EU Relations: <http://www.natolibguides.info/nato-eu>

Not only do NATO LibGuides give an excellent overview of any given topic, but also they recommend a number of other resources – or as they put it – good places to start your research. Of your particular interest should be those on Maritime Security and NATO-EU Relations.

NATO Maritime Command: <http://www.mc.nato.int/Pages/home.aspx>

The official site of NATO Maritime Command provides collated information on operations, Standing Naval Forces, exercises, the headquarters as well as news updates. Therefore, it is recommended either to check the site regularly or to follow its activity on social media.

Factsheet – European Naval Force – Mediterranean (Operation Sophia):

https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavfor-med/pdf/factsheet_eunavfor_med_en.pdf

A comprehensive overview of the mission's mandate, phases, facts and figures.

Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133163.htm

Full text of the first of its kind document as signed during the Warsaw Summit on 8 July 2016. Important for understanding of the future scope of NATO-EU cooperation.



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Pražský studentský summit

Pražský studentský summit je unikátní vzdělávací projekt existující od roku 1995. Každoročně vzdělává přes 300 studentů středních i vysokých škol o současných globálních tématech, a to především prostřednictvím simulace jednání čtyř klíčových mezinárodních organizací – OSN, NATO, EU a OBSE.

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Asociace pro mezinárodní otázky (AMO)

AMO je nevládní nezisková organizace založená v roce 1997 za účelem výzkumu a vzdělávání v oblasti mezinárodních vztahů. Tento přední český zahraničně politický think-tank není spjat s žádnou politickou stranou ani ideologií. Svou činností podporuje aktivní přístup k zahraniční politice, poskytuje nestrannou analýzu mezinárodního dění a otevírá prostor k fundované diskusi.

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Background report slouží jako vzdělávací materiál pro žáky středních škol účastníků se Pražského studentského summitu. Všichni partneři projektu jsou uvedeni [zde](#).



Generální partner

