



AMO.CZ

LISTOPAD 2017

BACKGROUND REPORT | XXIII | NATO | I

The Arctic region



PRAŽSKÝ STUDENTSKÝ SUMMIT | WWW.STUDENTSUMMIT.CZ



1 Introduction

The problem introduced in this paper is multidimensional and unfortunately NATO is able and authorised to solve only some of them. It cannot solve the border disputes between the Arctic countries¹; it cannot interfere with bilateral relationships of participating countries and it surely cannot prevent global warming.² However, due to the discovery of vast oil and gas reserves and the possible mass utilization of the Northern Sea Route,³ the region became an area of interest for many countries, including Russia, and NATO can help stabilizing it while helping the member and partnered countries involved. NATO also should find a united stance on the Arctic and Russia's quiet militarization of the region. This paper briefly describes the different actors and their points of view and should give you the basic information regarding the region.

2 Introduction to the Arctic region and UNCLOS

2.1 Geopolitical definition

The Arctic region, sometimes inaccurately called the High North⁴, is complicated in many ways, some of them will be discussed further in this paper. Due to the constant melting and refreezing of the Arctic Ocean, it is very hard to identify the land borders between different Arctic countries such as Norway and Russia and even the definition of the Arctic region itself can be a bit tricky. There are three main methods used to determine what lies in the Arctic. Its boundary is defined either by the line of average July temperature of $\sim 10^{\circ}\text{C}$, the northern limit of stands of trees on land (also called the treeline), or the Arctic Circle, an imaginary line of latitude located at 66 degrees 33 minutes North.⁵ Only eight countries⁶ have got a territory in the Arctic, five of them being members of NATO. The estimated area of the region is 14.5 million square kilometres and is inhabited by around four million people, out of which approximately half lives in the Russian part of the region.⁷

2.2 Brief history of the region

The first country to claim sovereignty⁸ over vast areas of the Arctic was Canada in 1925, followed by the Soviet Union in 1926. Claims of the U.S., Norway and Denmark followed. The claims were not internationally recognized until 1999 with the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).⁹ The militarization of the Arctic region began in 1957 when an American submarine USS Nautilus made a complete submerged transit of the North Pole. Since then the area has stayed high on the list of strategic locations both for USA and USSR. Since the late 1950s, the region has hosted key infrastructure to Russian nuclear weapons serving as a deterrent, especially on the Kola Peninsula¹⁰ and has always been a key to the Atlantic Ocean. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the need for a quick sea passage deepened because Russia lost several ports in the Baltic and the Black Sea.¹¹ This is one of the reasons Russia is interested in the region. On the other side of the barricade, during the 1960s and through the 1970s NATO was aware of the danger the Arctic region can pose, hence a solid infrastructure was developed in northern Norway and there were regular large land-, air-, and sea-forces exercises carried out in this area.¹²



Figure 1: Overlapping Arctic claims and resources.¹³



2.3 UNCLOS

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea recognizes several types of areas of ocean in which coastal states may exercise sovereignty. Firstly, territorial sea is described as an ocean space that extends twelve nautical miles from country's coastal low-water mark. The territorial waters are basically a continuation of the country's land territory. Secondly, between twelve and twenty-four nautical miles from the coastal low-water mark there is a contiguous zone that can be used while enforcing country's laws. A smuggler, for example, can be arrested in the contiguous zone. Lastly, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), lying from twenty-four to two hundred nautical miles from the coastal low-water mark lets the country exercise sovereignty over the natural resources in, on and below the seabed in its EEZ.

Apart from that, a country can expand its exclusive sovereignty up to 350 nautical miles from the coastal low-water mark if the area is a part of its continental shelf. Therefore, the country can control all the natural resources in and under the seabed. If two countries submit overlapping claims the UNCLOS instructs the countries to agree on a boundary.¹⁴



3 The strategic importance of the Arctic region

The Arctic lies in a unique strategic position, especially from a military point of view. A well-placed missile launch site or an anti-missile system could cover the whole northern flank of either Russia or NATO member states such as Norway, the United Kingdom and Iceland. During the Cold war, both the Alliance and the Soviet Union were militarizing their part of the region and conducting military exercises there.

In the last years the Arctic region is being influenced not only by the Arctic countries but also by global players. China, South Korea, India, Japan, Singapore, and many other countries are becoming more involved diplomatically and economically in the Arctic.¹⁵

3.1 Oil and gas reserves

The region is also very rich in oil and natural gas, according to a research conducted by the United States Geological Survey around 30% of world's undiscovered gas and 13% of the world's undiscovered oil may be found there, mostly offshore in under less than 500 meters of water.¹⁶

How does the price of oil change the interest of both Arctic and non-Arctic countries? Well, when global commodity demand is great and energy prices are high, the Arctic becomes more appealing to both Arctic and non-Arctic states for resource extraction, mining, and shipping. But when global demand weakens and oil prices are low, enthusiasm for Arctic development dissipates.¹⁷

3.2 Transportation – Northern Sea Route

With the ice cover melting away, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) is becoming more accessible for transport and as the picture provided shows it shortens the sail from the biggest area of production, China, to the biggest consumer market, the EU, by almost three thousand miles.^{18,19} The Russian government envisions the NSR as a new maritime highway and the collection of potential transit fees along the NSR is seen as growing income for the state. The Russian Ministry of Transport has estimated that around 64 million tons of cargo could be transported using the NSR in 2020 and 85 million tons in 2030, compared to 0.66 million tons transported in 2014.²⁰ For comparison, the total gross weight of goods transported as part of EU short sea shipping is estimated at 1.8 billion tons of goods in 2015.²¹

Apart from the NSR there exists another way through the Arctic Ocean that is called the Northwest Passage (NWP). It connects the Pacific Ocean with the Atlantic Ocean through the Arctic Ocean via waterways through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Canada however takes some of the waterways as its internal waters and claims the right to bar transit in these areas. Most of the European countries and the USA classify these waters as international strait, where foreign ships have the right of transit passage in accordance to the UNCLOS.²² This situation can sometimes lead to international disputes such as the dispute between Canada and the USA in 2005.²³



Figure 2: A Shortcut Across The Top of the World²⁴

A Shortcut Across The Top of the World

The Northeast Passage, across the Arctic Ocean, provides a shorter alternative for cargo vessels travelling between Europe and Asia than using the Suez Canal. It is shorter than the Panama Canal route for some voyages between the North American west coast and Europe.

LENGTH OF A VOYAGE TO ROTTERDAM FROM:

YOKOHAMA, JAPAN
12,894 miles via Suez Canal,
8,452 miles via Northeast Passage

SHANGHAI, CHINA
12,107 miles via Suez Canal,
9,297 miles via Northeast Passage

VANCOUVER, CANADA
10,262 miles via Panama Canal,
8,038 miles via Northeast Passage



4 Relationship to Arctic

4.1 NATO

Even though five NATO member countries and two closely allied nations have a territory in the Arctic region, the Arctic was not mentioned in the 2010 Strategic Concept nor in the 2012 Chicago NATO summit declaration.²⁵ Some of the countries, especially Denmark, Norway and the Baltic states are urging the Alliance to look for a united approach to the region, mainly because they are feeling threatened by Russia. The other members do not think the problem is so urgent. Currently, NATO encourages the continuation of the cooperation between all of the Arctic states, especially in the areas of environmental crises and search and rescue missions.²⁶

NATO General Secretary, Jens Stoltenberg, said in an interview that: "There is the question of finding the right balance between military presence without increasing tensions and continuing to strive for as much cooperation with Russia, with the Arctic Council²⁷ as possible. We've seen that we have been able to cooperate for instance on Search and Rescue²⁸ on some environmental issues and I think it is important to do so."²⁹ The question of the Arctic region is close to the secretary general as he was the Norwegian prime minister for a period of time.

A new Atlantic Command has been introduced in 2017 and its purpose, among other, is to provide better surveillance of the maritime area between Greenland, Iceland and Britain. The Alliance has got a Centre of Excellence for Cold Weather Operations(COE-CWO) in the town of Tverlandet, Norway. The Centre offers a variety of training scenarios and all member countries can train their soldiers in cooperation with the CEO-CWO.³⁰




4.2 Russia

The fall of the USSR halted the militarization of the High North, leaving most of the secret bases unoccupied, but the situation is changing rapidly in the recent years. The 2014 Russian military doctrine states that one of the main tasks of the Armed Forces, other troops and authorities is to "software National interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic."³¹

Evidence of following the doctrine can be seen in the opening of a new secret base in the Franz Josef Archipelago³² or the formation of a new Arctic brigade.³³ Also, Russia's new strategic military command brings together the Northern Fleet, Russia's biggest naval fleet with most of the missile-carrying strategic submarines³⁴ and an astonishing number of icebreakers compared to NATO³⁵ and other units in the Arctic under a unified command.³⁶ Fourteen new operational airfields and sixteen deepwater ports in the region indicate Russia's intentions.³⁷ With these and more capabilities Russia seems to have the upper hand at the moment, yet the aged nature of their equipment gives NATO an opportunity to deter the potential regional aggression if action is swiftly taken.³⁸

Figure 3: Russian military installations proximate to the Arctic.³⁹



4.3 Other

4.3.1. SWEDEN AND FINLAND

Both Sweden and Finland are one of NATO's most active partners, members of the Partnership for Peace programme⁴⁰ since 1994 and contributors to NATO missions in Afghanistan.⁴¹

As for the Swedish strategy for the Arctic region states, Sweden will actively contribute to the ongoing development of an EU policy on Arctic issues, especially to overcoming challenges like climate change and seizing opportunities in fishing, shipping, trade and energy extraction. Another of its goals is that the Arctic remains a region where security policy tensions are low. Sweden emphasises the



importance of an approach based on a broad concept of security,⁴² and that the use of civil instruments is preferable to military means.⁴³

Finland's Strategy for the Arctic region, is in many ways similar to the Swedish one, placing emphasis on resolving issues in peace.⁴⁴

4.3.2. CHINA

As the Chinese Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo said: "The Arctic belongs to all the people around the world, as no nation has sovereignty over it. (...) China must plan an indispensable role in Arctic exploration as we have one-fifth of the world's population."⁴⁵ This helps to summarize the stance China has on the Arctic region, especially because China does not have a known security policy regarding the Arctic. It received the Permanent Observer Status of the Arctic Council in 2013.⁴⁶

4.3.3. THE ARCTIC COUNCIL

Founded in 1996 by the Ottawa Declaration,⁴⁷ the Arctic Council should promote cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States on issues such as environmental protection and sustainable development. It has conducted studies on climate change, oil and gas reserves in the Arctic and Arctic shipping.^{48,49} Its members are all of the previously mentioned eight Arctic countries.⁵⁰

5 Conclusion

Although the Arctic region has been an area of low conflict among the Arctic powers, NATO should consider the implications of Russia's recent aggressive military behaviour. It is vital that NATO members find a common stance on the situation in the region as soon as possible. Otherwise different big players will take advantage of the democratic process inside NATO and take what they want. Even though the Arctic region can look distant to countries like Italy or Portugal the joint decision will bring all the member countries closer to each other and help in finding common ground in other situations. NATO is a collective security organization designed to defend the territorial integrity of its members and five NATO members are Arctic countries, and each has territory above the Arctic Circle. In addition, two closely allied nations (Finland and Sweden) also have Arctic territory. ⁵¹

Fundamental questions

- The following questions should help you think about the problem from the position of your country. The answers to them lie behind some research but do not worry, with the answers more questions will arise.
- Should NATO be involved in the Arctic region?
- Can Russia's behaviour be seen as hostile towards NATO?
- Is my country open to cooperation with Russia?
- What interests does my country have in the Arctic region?
- Are there any opportunities for my country in the Arctic?
- Is militarization of the region the right solution? If not, what is?
- In a long term point of view, should the number of soldiers in the Arctic on both sides increase or decrease?
- Should all NATO members be involved in solving this problem?
- Can a parallel with Crimea and Ukraine be found here?



More useful information

To read more about the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that addresses and defines the rights and responsibilities of nations with respect to their use of the world's ocean, please read the following document: **A Quick Start Guide to the Arctic and UNCLOS**. <http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/a-quick-start-guide-to-the-arctic-and-unclos/>

To get to know more about the possible solutions to the many disputes in the region watch this video: **Who Owns the Arctic: Who Makes the Rules?** <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VakyPSacsIw>

To get a more profound insight into the military capabilities of five of the Arctic countries, read this: **Military capabilities in the Arctic** <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Military-capabilities-in-the-Arctic.pdf>

For a **starting point in your own research**, you can use this page: <http://www.natolibguides.info/arcticsecurity>

Resources

¹ The Arctic countries are United States, Canada, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Russia and Sweden.

² These problems are being solved by different international organizations such as the United Nations, EU and the Arctic Council.

³ For more information about the Northern sea route, see below

⁴ Check out the definition of High North here: GEOPOLITICS IN THE HIGH NORTH, 2017. The High North - an elastic concept? - Page 2. [online]. 2017. [Accessed 10 July 2017]. Available from:

http://www.geopoliticsnorth.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1:an-international-research-project&catid=44&Itemid=37&showall=&limitstart=1

⁵ WOODS HOLE OCEANOGRAPHIC INSTITUTION, [no date]. Polar Discovery :: Arctic Location and Geography. [online]. [Accessed 4 July 2017]. Available from: <http://polardiscovery.whoi.edu/arctic/geography.html>

⁶ USA, Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia

⁷ RUSSIAN GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY, [no date]. Population / Arctic. [online]. [Accessed 4 July 2017]. Available from: <http://arctic.ru/population/>

⁸ Among generally accepted proofs of sovereignty in international law are discovery of territory, the ceding of territory from one nation to another, conquest, and administration. More about territorial claims in international law here: SUMNER, Brian Taylor, 2004. Territorial disputes at the International Court of Justice. Duke Law Journal. 2004. Vol. 53, no. 6, p. 1779–1812.

⁹ MICALLEF, Steve, 2017. Russia's Evolving Arctic Capabilities. Center for International Maritime Security [online]. 7 February 2017. [Accessed 11 July 2017]. Available from: <http://cimsec.org/russias-evolving-arctic-capabilities/30712>

¹⁰ ÅTLAND, Kristian, 2011. Russia's Armed Forces and the Arctic: All Quiet on the Northern Front? Contemporary Security Policy. August 2011. Vol. 32, no. 2, p. 267–285. DOI 10.1080/13523260.2011.590354.

¹¹ E.g. Port Paldiski in Estonia and Sevastopol in the Ukraine. BLANK, Stephen and ARMY WAR COLLEGE (U.S.) (eds.), 2011. Russia in the Arctic. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute monograph. ISBN 978-1-58487-496-6. UA880 .R87 2011



- ¹² DYNDAL, GjertLage, 2011. How the High North became Central in NATO Strategy: Revelations from the NATO Archives. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 1 August 2011. Vol. 34, no. 4, p. 557–585. DOI 10.1080/01402390.2011.561094
- ¹³ MICALLEF, Steve, 2017. Russia's Evolving Arctic Capabilities. Center for International Maritime Security [online]. 7 February 2017. [Accessed 11 July 2017]. Available from: <http://cimsec.org/russias-evolving-arctic-capabilities/30712>By.
- ¹⁴ UNITED NATIONS, 1982. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 1982;
- HOLMES, Stephanie, 2008. Breaking the ice: emerging legal issues in Arctic sovereignty. *Chi. J. Int'l L.* 2008. Vol. 9, p. 323.
- ¹⁵ America in the Arctic, [no date]. [online]. [Accessed 17 November 2017]. Available from: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/america-arctic>
- ¹⁶ GAUTIER, Donald L., Kenneth J. BIRD, Ronald R. CHARPENTIER, Arthur GRANTZ, Daseen W. HOUSEKNECHT, Timothy R. KLETT, Thomas E. MOORE, Janet K. PITMAN, Christopher J. SCHENK, John H. SCHUENEMEYER, Kai SØRENSEN, Marilyn E. TENNYSON, Zenon C. VALIN a Craig J. WANDREY, 2009. Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic. *Science* [online]. 324(5931), 1175–1179. ISSN 0036-8075, 1095-9203. Available from: doi:10.1126/science.1169467
- ¹⁷ America in the Arctic, [no date]. [online]. [Accessed 17 November 2017]. Available from: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/america-arctic>.
- ¹⁸ That is around 24% of the voyage.
- ¹⁹ FARRÉ, Albert Buixadé, STEPHENSON, Scott R., CHEN, Linling, CZUB, Michael, DAI, Ying, DEMCHEV, Denis, EFIMOV, Yaroslav, GRACZYK, Piotr, GRYTHE, Henrik, KEIL, Kathrin, KIVEKÄS, Niku, KUMAR, Naresh, LIU, Nengye, MATELENOK, Igor, MYKSVOLL, Mari, O'LEARY, Derek, OLSEN, Julia, PAVITHRAN.A.P, Sachin, PETERSEN, Edward, RASPOTNIK, Andreas, RYZHOV, Ivan, SOLSKI, Jan, SUO, Lingling, TROEIN, Caroline, VALEEVA, Vilena, RIJCKEVORSEL, Jaap van and WIGHTING, Jonathan, 2014. Commercial Arctic shipping through the Northeast Passage: routes, resources, governance, technology, and infrastructure. *Polar Geography*. 2 October 2014. Vol. 37, no. 4, p. 298–324. DOI 10.1080/1088937X.2014.965769.
- ²⁰ KÄPYLÄ, Juha, MIKKOLA, Harri and MARTIKAINEN, Toivo, 2016. Briefing Paper - Moscow's Arctic dreams turned sour? Analysing Russia's policies in the Arctic. The Finnish institute of International Affairs [online]. March 2016. [Accessed 11 July 2017]. Available from: http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/575/moscow_s_arctic_dreams_turned_sour/?utm_source=julkaisutiedote_eng&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=moscows%20arctic%20
- ²¹ EUROSTAT, [no date]. Maritime transport statistics - short sea shipping of goods - Statistics Explained. [online]. [Accessed 22 October 2017]. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Maritime_transport_statistics_-_short_sea_shipping_of_goods
- ²² CARNAGHAN, Matthew and GOODY, Allison, 2006. Canadian Arctic Sovereignty (PRB 05-61E) [online]. 2006. [Accessed 20 October 2017]. Available from: <https://lop.parl.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prbo561-e.htm>PRB 05-61E
- ²³ OZECK, Dave, [no date]. USS Charlotte Achieves Milestone During Under-Ice Transit. [online]. [Accessed 18 November 2017]. Available from: [/submit/display.asp?story_id=21223](#)
- ²⁴ THE NEW YORK TIMES, [no date]. A Shortcut Across the Top of the World. [online]. [Accessed 9 July 2017]. Available from:



<http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2009/09/11/science/earth/11passage.map.ready.html>

²⁵ COFFEY, Luke, [no date]. NATO in the Arctic: Challenges and Opportunities. The Heritage Foundation [online]. [Accessed 11 July 2017]. Available from: </trade/report/nato-the-arctic-challenges-and-opportunities>

²⁶ LINDGREN, Wrenn Yennie and GRÆGER, Nina, 2017. Small states and international security: Europe and beyond. ANU Press.

²⁷ For an explanation of what the Arctic council is, see part 4.3.3. of this paper

²⁸ Search and rescue (SAR) is the search for and provision of aid to people who are in distress or imminent danger. To have full context of the situation read the Agreement signed by the Arctic countries about cooperation on SAR missions in the Arctic here: COUNCIL, Arctic, 2011. Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic. [online]. 2011. [Accessed 18 July 2017]. Available from: <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/531>

²⁹ BELFER CENTER, [no date]. Jens Stoltenberg: Is NATO Thinking about the Arctic? [online]. Available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QEu99-cb8Xc>

³⁰ FORSVARET, [no date]. Centre of Excellence for Cold Weather Operations. [online]. [Accessed 14 July 2017]. Available from: <http://forsvaret.no/en/education-and-training/coe-cwo>

³¹ RUSSIA, 2014. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation [online]. 2014. [Accessed 8 July 2017]. Available from: <https://www.offiziere.ch/wp-content/uploads-001/2015/08/Russia-s-2014-Military-Doctrine.pdf>

³² Named Nagurskoye on Figure 3 further in the paper. ROBINSON, Julian, 2017. Russia unveils Arctic military base housing nuclear-ready warplanes. Mail Online [online]. 18 April 2017. [Accessed 2 July 2017]. Available from: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/~article-4421072/index.html>

³³ SPUTNIK, [no date]. Russia's "Polar Bear Spetznas" Step Up Defense of Country's Arctic Borders. [online]. [Accessed 12 July 2017]. Available from: <https://sputniknews.com/russia/201607121042846962-russia-arctic-troops-analysis/>

³⁴ A ballistic missile strategic submarine is a submarine deploying submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with nuclear warheads. CONLEY, Heather A. and ROHLOFF, Caroline, 2015. The New Ice Curtain: Russia's Strategic Reach to the Arctic. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-1-4422-5883-9. Google-Books-ID: JBqACgAAQBAJ

³⁵ At the moment, Russia has got 41 icebreakers and another 11 under construction while the US has three, Canada eight and Norway one.

³⁶ KÄPYLÄ, Juha, MIKKOLA, Harri and MARTIKAINEN, Toivo, 2016. Briefing Paper - Moscow's Arctic dreams turned sour? Analysing Russia's policies in the Arctic. The Finnish institute of International Affairs [online]. March 2016. [Accessed 11 July 2017]. Available from: http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/575/moscow_s_arctic_dreams_turned_sour/?utm_source=julkaisutiedote_eng&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=moscows%20arctic%20

³⁷ Here's What Russia's Military Build-Up in the Arctic Looks Like, [no date]. Foreign Policy [online]. [Accessed 18 November 2017]. Available from: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/25/heres-what-russias-military-build-up-in-the-arctic-looks-like-trump-oil-military-high-north-infographic-map/>

³⁸ BIRDWELL, Ian, 2017. The NATO of the New North. Center for International Maritime Security [online]. 16 May 2017. [Accessed 9 July 2017]. Available from: <http://cimsec.org/nato-new-north/32539>



- ³⁹ MICALLEF, Steve, 2017. Russia's Evolving Arctic Capabilities. Center for International Maritime Security [online]. 7 February 2017. [Accessed 11 July 2017]. Available from: <http://cimsec.org/russias-evolving-arctic-capabilities/30712>
- ⁴⁰ To learn more about the Partnership for Peace programme visit this link: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm
- ⁴¹ NATO, [no date]. Relations with Sweden. NATO [online]. [Accessed 14 July 2017]. Available from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52535.htm.
- NATO, [no date]. Relations with Finland. NATO [online]. [Accessed 14 July 2017]. Available from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49594.htm.
- ⁴² Concept that includes include social economic and ecological trends and view them in relation to the security of the country or region.
- ⁴³ SWEDEN, 2011. Swedens Strategy for the Arctic Region [online]. 2011. [Accessed 14 July 2017]. Available from: <https://openaid.se/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Swedens-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf>
- ⁴⁴ FINLAND, 2013. Finland's Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013. Government resolution on 23 August 2013 [online]. 2013. Prime Minister's Office. [Accessed 13 July 2017]. Available from: <http://vnk.fi/documents/10616/334509/Arktinen+strategia+2013+en.pdf/6b6fb723-40ec-4c17-b286-5b5910fbecf4>
- ⁴⁵ CAMPBELL, Caitlin, 2012. China and the Arctic: Objectives and Obstacles [online]. 2012. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. [Accessed 8 July 2017]. Available from: https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China-and-the-Arctic_Apr2012.pdf
- ⁴⁶ There are thirteen observer states approved by the Arctic Council: France, Germany, Italian Republic, Japan, The Netherlands, People's Republic of China, Poland, Republic of India, Republic of Korea, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
- ⁴⁷ ARCTIC COUNCIL, 1996. Canada-Denmark-Finland-Iceland-Norway-Russian Federation-Sweden-United States: Joint Communiqué and Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council [online]. 1996. [Accessed 13 July 2017]. Available from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20698622>
- ⁴⁸ SAVAGE, Luiza Ch., 2013. Why everyone wants a piece of the Arctic. *Macleans.ca* [online]. 5 2013. [Accessed 9 July 2017]. Available from: <http://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/why-the-world-wants-the-arctic/>.
- ⁴⁹ FARRÉ, Albert Buixadé, STEPHENSON, Scott R., CHEN, Linling, CZUB, Michael, DAI, Ying, DEMCHEV, Denis, EFIMOV, Yaroslav, GRACZYK, Piotr, GRYTHE, Henrik, KEIL, Kathrin, KIVEKÄS, Niku, KUMAR, Naresh, LIU, Nengye, MATELENOK, Igor, MYKSVOLL, Mari, O'LEARY, Derek, OLSEN, Julia, PAVITHRAN.A.P, Sachin, PETERSEN, Edward, RASPOTNIK, Andreas, RYZHOV, Ivan, SOLSKI, Jan, SUO, Lingling, TROEIN, Caroline, VALEEVA, Vilena, RIJCKEVORSEL, Jaap van and WIGHTING, Jonathan, 2014. Commercial Arctic shipping through the Northeast Passage: routes, resources, governance, technology, and infrastructure. *Polar Geography*. 2 October 2014. Vol. 37, no. 4, p. 298–324. DOI 10.1080/1088937X.2014.965769.
- ⁵⁰ United States, Canada, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Russia and Sweden.
- ⁵¹ COFFEY, Luke, [no date]. NATO Summit 2016: Time for an Arctic Strategy. The Heritage Foundation [online]. [Accessed 18 November 2017]. Available from: </global-politics/report/nato-summit-2016-time-arctic-strategy>



Pražský studentský summit

Pražský studentský summit je unikátní vzdělávací projekt existující od roku 1995. Každoročně vzdělává přes 300 studentů středních i vysokých škol o současných globálních tématech, a to především prostřednictvím simulace jednání čtyř klíčových mezinárodních organizací – OSN, NATO, EU a OBSE.



www.studentsummit.cz



www.facebook.com/studentsummit



summit@amo.cz



www.twitter.com/studentsummit



www.instagram.com/praguestudentsummit



www.youtube.com/studentsummitcz

Asociace pro mezinárodní otázky (AMO)

AMO je nevládní nezisková organizace založená v roce 1997 za účelem výzkumu a vzdělávání v oblasti mezinárodních vztahů. Tento přední český zahraničně politický think-tank není spjat s žádnou politickou stranou ani ideologií. Svou činností podporuje aktivní přístup k zahraniční politice, poskytuje nestrannou analýzu mezinárodního dění a otevírá prostor k fundované diskusi.



+420 224 813 460



www.facebook.com/AMO.cz



www.amo.cz



www.twitter.com/amo_cz



info@amo.cz



www.linkedin.com/company/amocz



Žitná 608/27, 110 00 Praha 1



www.youtube.com/AMOCz

Ondřej Kovanda

Autor je spolupracovníkem Asociace pro mezinárodní otázky a členem přípravného týmu Pražského studentského summitu.

Background report je materiál pro žáky středních škol účastnících se Pražského studentského summitu. Všichni partneři projektu jsou uvedeni [zde](#).



The Kellner
Family
Foundation



Generální partner
Pražského studentského summitu



Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí
České republiky



TOP
partneři



Partneři

HOSPODÁŘSKÉ NOVINY

RESPEKT

Mediální
partneři



Za
podpory